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Speech and Technology
Russell L. Weaver*
During the last millennium, a steady evolution in "speech
technology" has transformed the nature of public discussion. Prior to the
development of the printing press in 1436,1 mass communication was
notoriously difficult. Oral methods of communication were available,
but were an ineffective means for reaching large audiences. Handwritten
texts could be distributed more widely, but could only be produced
slowly and laboriously. As a result, the printing press represented a
major advancement in speech technology that made it possible for people
to communicate much more easily and effectively and enabled people to
disseminate their ideas far more widely, once literacy rates caught up
with the ability to print texts.
In the last two hundred years, technological developments have
continued to revolutionize mass communication. In the Nineteenth
Century and the early part of the Twentieth Century, development of the
telegraph and of broadcast technology (in particular, radio and television)
enabled people to communicate over long distances very quickly, and
made quick and effective national and international communication
possible for the first time. Despite the significance of broadcast
communication, it pales in comparison to the technological explosion
that occurred at the end of the Twentieth Century. During the last thirty
years, communications technology has evolved rapidly in many
divergent ways. In addition to cable television, new technologies have
evolved including satellite communications, the Internet, and cell phones
(which now come with text messaging and rapidly evolving content).
Throughout history, as new communications have developed,
governments have struggled to respond to the power and the perceived
potential for harm that resulted from those technologies. In some
instances, governments recoiled at the prospect that people could more
* Professor of Law & Distinguished University Scholar, Louis D. Brandeis School
of Law, University of Louisville.
1. Johannes Guttenberg of Mainz, Germany, created the first printing press when
he devised a system of movable and removable typeface. When a page was set, it could
be used to produce multiple copies of the same printed text.
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readily communicate with one another. Governments feared that these
new technologies would be used to criticize and undermine their
authority. They also feared that new technologies might be used to
disseminate harmful content such as pornography.
Within the constraints of a short piece, this article offers insight into
the history of speech communication and speech regulation, and
examines different regulatory approaches applied to new and evolving
forms of technology.
I. Print Media
Fearing that printing presses might be used to criticize government,
many governments responded with repression and efforts to control this
new technology. The British Crown established licensing schemes that
forced printers to obtain official approval before publishing.2 Licensors
could withhold permission to print texts that they found objectionable or
that they regarded as unduly critical of government. In addition to
licensing, England responded by creating the crime of seditious libel,
3
which made it illegal to criticize the government or governmental
officials (and, at one point, the clergy as well).4 Governments also
repressed printing through the use of civil defamation laws, which made
it possible for governmental officials and others to recover civil damages
2. See William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of
Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 97-98 (1984); see also NORMAN L. ROSENBERG,
PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE THEORY OF THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF
LIBEL (U. N. Carolina Press 1986); M. LINDSAY KAPLAN, THE CULTURE OF SLANDER IN
EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997); RUSSELL L. WEAVER &
ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 279
(LexisNexis 2002); De Libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (Star Chamber 1606); see
Judith Schenck Koffler & Bennett L. Gershman, The New Seditious Libel, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 816 (1984); Jeffrey K. Walker, A Poisen in Ye Commonwealthe: Seditious Libel in
Hanoverian London, 25(3) ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 341-66 (1996).
3. De Libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (Star Chamber 1606); see Judith Schenck
Koffler & Bennett L. Gershman, The New Seditious Libel, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 816
(1984); Jeffrey K. Walker, A Poisen in Ye Commonwealthe: Seditious Libel in
Hanoverian London, 25(3) ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 341-66 (1996).
4. The crime was justified by the notion that criticism of the government
"inculcated a disrespect for public authority." See Matt J. O'Laughlin, Exigent
Circumstances: Circumscribing the Exclusionary Rule in Response to 9/11, 70 UMKC L.
REV. 707, 720-21 (2002). "Since maintaining a proper regard for government was the
goal of this new offense, it followed that truth was just as reprehensible as falsehood" and
therefore was not a defense. William R. Glendon, The Trial of John Peter Zenger, 68
N.Y. ST. B.J. 48, 49 (Dec. 1996). Indeed, truthful criticisms were punished more severely
because it was assumed that true criticisms were more potentially more damaging to the
government. See Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to




for defamatory criticisms of their actions. 5
Despite initial repression of the print media, the United States
eventually came to grips with the printing press and began to limit the
government's ability to suppress the press. The United States Supreme
Court declared most licensing schemes presumptively unconstitutional
6
and invalidated the crime of seditious libel,7 which made it difficult for
public officials and public figures to recover for defamation.8 The net
effect is that the Court ultimately began to treat the printing press as a
highly protected method of communication. 9
In the United States, the printing press has not been completely
insulated from governmental regulation. The Court has held that the
government may prohibit certain categories of speech including
"obscenity,"10 and so-called "kiddie porn" (pornographic pictures of
children.)11 In addition, in Ginsberg v. New York,12 the Court upheld a
New York statute prohibiting the sale of material that was deemed to be
"obscene" for minors even if not deemed "obscene" for adults. In that
case, the Court emphasized the "State's independent interest in the well-
being of its youth" and the parent's interest in directing the upbringing of
their children.' 3 Nevertheless, cases like Miller, Ferber and Ginsberg are
the exceptions that prove the general rule.
5. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
7. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
8. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In order to do so,
they were required to show that the defendant had acted with "actual malice," meaning
that the defendant either knew that the allegedly defamatory statement was false or acted
in reckless disregard for truth or falsity. Id. at 280.
9. For example, in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), the
Court refused to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing
the contents of a classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on
Viet Nam Policy" despite claims that the documents were classified and that they had
been stolen, as well as the fact that its disclosure might have an adverse impact on
national security. Likewise, in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the
Court articulated a broad rule against prior restraints in a case where the county attorney
of Hennepin county sued to enjoin publication of what was described as a "malicious,
scandalous and defamatory newspaper." Id. at 702. The Court even held that speakers
could advocate illegal action except in limited situations. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1968) (Court struck down Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Statute as applied to a
Klu Klux Klan rally held in Ohio, and it did so even though there was talk of
"revengance" as well as ethnic and racial slurs).
10. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
11. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773-74 (1982).
12. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
13. Id. at 640.
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II. Broadcast Regulation: Stringency in the Face of Growing
Irrelevancy
As broadcast technology began to supplement the print media in the
Twentieth Century, Congress and the courts struggled to define its status
and the level of protection it should receive. Eventually, the Court
rejected the idea that broadcast media should be accorded the preferred
status accorded to the print media and thereby receive a preferred
position in the constitutional hierarchy. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC 14 the Court concluded that the government had much greater power
to regulate radio and television broadcasts.
Red Lion involved the so-called "Fairness Doctrine" which required
broadcast licensees to practice editorial fairness and balance. 15 Even
though the doctrine would have been unconstitutional as applied to the
print media (because it involved an inappropriate content-based
restriction on speech), the Court upheld the Fairness Doctrine as applied
to radio and television noting that "[a]lthough broadcasting is clearly a
medium affected by a First Amendment interest, differences in the
characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment
standards applied to them."' 6  The Court concluded that radio and
television broadcasting should be treated differently than the print media
because "there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast
than there are frequencies to allocate....',1 As a result of this scarcity
of access, those few who were given access to the airwaves could be
subjected to special obligations.
The Court's less protective approach to the broadcast media was
dramatically revealed in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.18 In that case, the
Court held that the FCC could prohibit a radio station from broadcasting
George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue.' 9 The Pacifica Foundation,
which broadcast the material, argued that the monologue was broadcast
as part of "a program about contemporary society's attitude toward
language," and characterized Carlin as a satirist who was poking fun at
our attitudes toward these words.2° In other words, the broadcast
involved material of literary, artistic, social and political value deserving
of First Amendment protection. Describing the broadcast as "vulgar,"
"offensive" and "shocking," although not obscene, the Court concluded
that the FCC could relegate the broadcast to late night hours when
14. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 387.
17. Id. at 388.
18. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 730.
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children would be less likely to be listening.21  The Court justified its
decision by reference to the invasive nature of the technology, which can
be accessed from both cars and houses, and the fact that broadcasting is
uniquely accessible to children.22
Although the FCC has since abandoned the so-called "Fairness
Doctrine," and has given the broadcast media special protections in some
later cases, 23 the Court continues to apply its dual-track approach, which
gives less protection to the broadcast media. In recent years, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) has used its power to crack down
on broadcast content, particularly "indecency." For example, the FCC
sanctioned CBS for the Janet Jackson Superbowl flap when there was a
one second "flash" of her breast during a half-time show.24 In addition,
the FCC has recently promulgated new rules designed to increase the
penalties for indecent communications.
2 5
The irony of the FCC's crackdown is that, as the FCC has increased
its penalties, the FCC's role and importance has been dramatically
diminished by technological advances. Following the FCC's
announcement of its new rules, Clear Channel Communications
suspended so-called "shock jock" Howard Stern for violating the new
decency standards.26 Howard responded by leaving Clear Channel for
satellite broadcasting which was free of FCC oversight.27 In the process,
he freed himself from FCC control and the new rules. As other "new"
forms of technology come online, traditional broadcast communication is
rapidly being overtaken by these newer forms, and (absent major
regulatory changes) the strict FCC rules are likely to assume a position of
much less importance and relevance.
III. The Technological Onslaught
In recent decades, society has seen the development of a wave of
new forms of speech technology. First came advances such as cable
television and the Internet, but these advances were soon followed by
21. Id.
22. Id. at 748-49.
23. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984)
(striking down a restriction on public broadcasters that prohibited "editorializing");
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
24. See Janet Jackson Takes Responsibility for Breast-baring, CNN, Feb. 4, 2004, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/SHOWBIZ/TV/02/04/jackson.apology.ap/index.html
(providing a more detailed explanation of the incident, including some of the
repercussions).
25. See http://www.peak.org/mailing-list/archive/grc/msg01005.html.
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significant innovations in satellite communications, as well as in cell
phone and text messaging systems. These evolving, almost exploding,
forms of technology have raised new and important regulatory questions.
Specifically, will the Court apply its print media precedent, or will it
apply its broadcast precedent to these technologies? Many of the new
technologies are similar to broadcast technology in that they can enter
millions of homes, but in some respects, the new technologies are more
powerful than radio and television. Whereas broadcast technologies can
only transmit information a limited distance, many of the new
technologies can transmit information around the world through the push
of a button or, more commonly, by the click of a mouse.
Many of the "new" technologies are also distinguishable from
broadcast technology because the "scarcity" rationale, used by the Court
in Red Lion to justify more restrictive regulation of radio and television
broadcasting, simply does not apply. 28  With many of the new
technologies, accessibility is a less important issue or a non-issue.
Anyone who can afford a computer and the price of an Internet
connection (or, for that matter, a cell phone and text messaging system)
can "broadcast" information to people around the world. Even those
who cannot afford a computer or a cell phone can gain access to the
Internet through their employer or a university, their local library or a
storefront "computer coffee shop." The net effect is that hundreds of
millions of people now have access to modem speech technology, and
that number is expected to grow dramatically in the coming years.29
Those who do gain access can connect to millions of others through web
sites, chat rooms, e-mails, listservices (which retransmit e-mails to
everyone on the list), news groups, and the "World Wide Web."
While the accessibility of the Internet distinguishes it from
broadcasting, this accessibility also raises a number of concerns. As
computers and Internet access (as well as cell phones) become
commonplace, there is a very real and significant risk that children will
gain easy access to damaging or potentially harmful material. Anyone
who uses modem e-mail systems, and who is bombarded by hundreds of
spain e-mails per day, realizes that the Internet contains much material
that is unsuitable for children, including a good deal of sexually explicit
material. As the Court recognized in Pacifica, the government is entitled
28. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
29. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997), discussing
how nearly forty million people use the intemet and approximately 200 million are
expected to do so by 1999. The Court estimated that the number of "host" computers
(computers that store information and relay communications) "increased from about 300
in 1981 to approximately 9,400,000 by the time of the trial in 1996." Id. Forty percent of
these "host computers" were located outside the U.S. Id.
[Vol. 110:3
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to protect children from indecent communications, which an adult would
have an unfettered right to receive, by "zoning" the material to times
when children are less likely to be viewing.30 As a result, there is a
significant governmental interest in regulating the Internet. The
difficulty is that "zoning" is virtually impossible on the Internet. Unlike
radio and television broadcasting, which can restrict potentially
objectionable programs to hours of the day when children are less likely
to be listening, the Internet is "open for business" twenty-four hours a
day. Indeed, most web pages and web sites are constantly available, and
listserves can automatically forward e-mail at any time of the day or
night. As a result, restricting Internet communications (or, for that
matter, cell phone and text messaging) to "children-safe" hours is
virtually impossible.
Of course, the Internet is different from broadcast technology in that
Internet users are less likely to encounter sexually explicit materials
accidentally. Before a document can be accessed online, it is usually
preceded by its title and a description of its contents, and if it is sexually
explicit material, it may also be accompanied by a warning. 3' Of course,
these warnings do not prevent a child who sets out to access sexually
explicit material from doing so. Moreover, although parents can attempt
to control their children's access to certain sites through barrier software,
that can block designated inappropriate sites or attempt to block
messages containing identifiable objectionable features, 32 this software is
hardly foolproof. Most blocking software is either ineffective or tends to
over-block.33
The Internet creates particular problems relating to children because
it is difficult for individuals who access web sites, listservices, chat
rooms, or e-mails to verify the age and identity of the individuals to
whom they communicate. Although an operator of a web site may
condition access on the verification of requested information such as a
credit card number or an adult password, such verification is only
possible in connection with a commercial transaction when a card is
used, or by payment to a verification agency. Either approach imposes
significant costs on Internet providers, and would preclude those who
cannot obtain a credit card.
Despite the dangers of the new technologies, the United States
Supreme Court has generally chosen to treat the Internet and other
"modern" technologies more like print media than broadcast
30. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978).
31. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 854.
32. Id. at 855.
33. Id.
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technology. 34 The precedent is not without exception. For example, in
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,35 the Court held that cable
television stations could be required to devote a percentage of their
channels to the transmission of local broadcast stations, which is a
restriction that would not have been upheld if applied against
newspapers. In addition, the FCC has asserted jurisdiction over cable
television.36
On the other hand, this analysis has been different with regard to the
Internet. For example, in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, the
Court articulated broad protections for Internet communications.37 Reno
involved the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which prohibited
"indecent" and "patently offensive" communications on the Internet.3 8
Congress's stated objective was to protect children from harmful
materials, and the CDA sought to accomplish that objective in two ways.
First, the Act prohibited the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent
messages to any recipient under eighteen years of age.39 Second, the Act
prohibited knowingly sending or displaying patently offensive messages
in a manner available to a person under eighteen years of age. 40 The
34. See id.
35. 512 U.S. 622, 654-55 (1994).
36. See http://www.fcc.gov/mb/.
37. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
38. Id. at 858-59.
39. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (Supp. 1997) provided in relevant part:
(a) Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications-
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the
recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age,
regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed
the call or initiated the communication;
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control
to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that
it be used for such activity,
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id.
40. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (Supp.1997) provided in relevant part:
(d) Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person
or persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner
available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context,
[Vol. 110:3
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CDA contained a defense for individuals who take "good faith,
reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions" to prevent minors from
gaining access to prohibited communications, as well as for those
individuals who restrict access by requiring proof of age.4
The Court struck down most provisions of the CDA.42 In reaching
its decision, the Court referred to the Internet as "a unique and wholly
new medium of worldwide human communication, 43 and refused to
apply its broadcast precedent (particularly Red Lion and Pacifica) to this
new technology.4 The Court distinguished the Internet from broadcast
technology based on its accessibility, noting that Internet technology is
not as invasive as broadcast technology.45 As a result, instead of relying
on its broadcast precedent, the Court placed greater reliance on its
holding in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC.46 In Sable,
the Court struck down portions of the Communications Act that imposed
a ban on indecent and obscene commercial telephone messages (a/k/a
"dial-a-porn").47 In Sable, the Court upheld the statute as applied to
obscene messages, but it struck it down the law as applied to indecent
messages. 48 The Court did so because the "dial it" medium "requires the
listener to take affirmative steps to receive the communication.
'A9
In Reno, the Court also distinguished between "indecent" speech
and "obscene" speech.50  The Court noted that the CDA involved a
content-based restriction on speech,51 and that the First Amendment
imposes "an especially heavy burden on the Government to explain why
a less restrictive provision would not be as effective as the CDA. 52 The
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call
or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such
person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with
the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id.
41. Reno, 521 U.S. at 860-861.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 850.
44. Id. at 868-69.
45. Id. at 869.
46. Id. at 875 (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n,
492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989)).
47. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115,
128 (1989).
48. Id.
49. Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28.
50. Reno, 521 U.S., at 872-74.
51. Id. at 872.
52. Id. at 879.
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Court concluded that the government had failed to satisfy that burden.53
The Court took an aggressive free speech stance and noted that, if
indecent speech could be prohibited from the internet, there would be an
unnecessarily broad suppression of speech available to adults that might
"reduc[e] the adult population [to] only what is fit for children., 54
Existing technology did not include any effective method for preventing
minors from obtaining access to information on the Internet, and it would
be prohibitively expensive to establish rules requiring adult
verification.55 In the Court's view, the only reasonable alternative was
for parents to use barrier software to prevent their children from
accessing undesirable segments of the Internet.56
The Court was particularly concerned about the fact that the CDA
applied to all commercial speech and commercial entities, as well as to
nonprofit entities and individuals posting indecent messages or
displaying them on their own computers in the presence of minors.57 In
addition, the CDA's vague terms-"indecent" and "patently
offensive"-included large amounts of nonpornographic material that
could have serious educational value. Finally, the CDA purported to
apply "community standards" such that any communication, whether
intended for a local or a national audience, would likely be judged by the
standards of the very community that was offended by the message.58
The Court rejected any analogy to Pacifica noting that broadcasting
communication had "received the most limited First Amendment
protection," because of "the ease with which children may obtain access
to broadcasts...., 59 The Court pointed out that the order in Pacifica was
"issued by an agency that had been regulating radio stations for decades,
targeted a specific broadcast that represented a rather dramatic departure
from traditional program content in order to designate when-rather than
whether-it would be permissible to air such a program in that particular
medium., 60 The Court noted that the CDA did not limit its application to
particular times, and did not involve an agency "familiar with the unique
characteristics of the Internet., 61 In addition, the Court emphasized that
the Pacifica order was not punitive whereas the CDA contained criminal
53. Id.
54. Id. at 875 (quoting Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 759 (1996)).
55. Id. at 876-77.
56. Idat 877.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 877-78.
59. Id. at 866.




penalties.62  Finally, "the risk of encountering indecent material by
accident is remote because a series of affirmative steps is required to
access specific material. 63
Reno also rejected the government's claim that it had the right to
patrol the Internet for "indecency" on the basis that "the unregulated
availability of 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' material on the Internet
is driving countless citizens away from the medium because of the risk of
exposing themselves or their children to harmful material. 64 The Court
found that the Internet was growing dramatically, even in the absence of
governmental control, and concluded that offensive content had not
dampened the growth.6 5 Indeed, the Court concluded that "governmental
regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the
free exchange of ideas than to encourage it."
66
In Reno's aftermath, the Court decided Ashcroft v. American Civil
Liberties Union,67 a case that involved the constitutionality of the Child
Online Protection Act (COPA), which was passed after Reno struck
down the CDA.6 8 COPA prohibited individuals from "knowingly and
with knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate or foreign
commerce by means of the World Wide Web, making any
communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor
and that includes any material that is harmful to minors.,,69 The case
came before the Court solely on the question of whether the Act's
consideration and inclusion of the concept of "contemporary community
standards" was constitutional. 70  The Court held that the community
standards provision was constitutional, but reserved consideration of the
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 885.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
68. Id.
69. See 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (2000). Specifically, COPA defined "material that is
harmful to minors" to include:
any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording,
writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or that-(A) the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking the
material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is
designed to pander to, the prurient interest; and (B) depicts, describes, or
represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or
simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or
perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent
female breast; and (C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value for minors.
Id.
70. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 585 (2002).
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overall constitutionality of COPA for a later day.71
In the Court's other major post-Reno decision, Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition,72 the Court considered the constitutionality of the
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA),73 which extended
the federal prohibition against child pornography to sexually explicit
images that appear to depict minors but were produced without using any
real children (also known as "virtual child pornography"). The CPPA
applied not only to obscene depictions of virtual child pornography, but
to non-obscene depictions. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court
struck down most of the CPPA.74 The Court indicated that it would have
upheld Section 2256(8)(C), dealing with morphed images (images of real
children that have been altered), but the parties chose not to challenge
that provision.7 5 However, the Court struck down the prohibition against
purely virtual images concluding that they did not harm or implicate the
interests of real children as required under the Court's prior holding in
New York v. Ferber.76 The Court considered and rejected arguments that
virtual child pornography should be prohibited because it might whet the
appetite of pedophiles, might be used to lure children into pedophilia, or
might be indistinguishable from pictures of actual children.77
IV. Conclusion
Just as the history of the world involves a steady path of
technological advancement and development, speech technology has
rapidly advanced over the centuries. Each new advance presents new
technological and regulatory challenges for governments. Whereas the
initial response to the printing press involved an attempt to stifle
criticism of government, governmental responses to more modern
technologies have focused on insulating children (and society, in general)
from intrinsically harmful materials. In the United States, doctrinal
development remains in a state of flux and uncertainty.
In recent years, there has been much discussion regarding the
possibility of creating international standards to control the Internet.
These attempts have been hampered by the fact that an effective
worldwide coalition requires the participation of most major developed
countries (and, indeed, of the entire world), and that speech regulation is
handled quite differently in other countries than it is handled in the
71. See id.
72. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
73. See 18. U.S.C.§ 2251(2003).
74. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002).
75. Id. at 252.
76. Id. at 249-51 (citing N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 757 (1982)).
77. Id. at 253-54.
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United States. As a result, regulations and restrictions that might be
upheld in other countries would not survive in the United States.
Even though decisions like Reno make it difficult for government to
impose content-based restrictions on Internet communications, they do
not preclude all regulation. In fact, the government may prohibit certain
types of communications from the Internet such as obscenity and "kiddie
porn." Even regarding indecent speech, the government may be able to
impose restrictions that do not unduly restrict adult access to such
materials. For example, as the Court suggested in Reno, the government
might require communications to be "tagged" in a way that facilitates
parental control of material coming into their homes. As the decisional
precedent indicates, the search for national and international standards
for regulating "new technologies" will continue for some time into the
future. In fact, as long as technology continues to advance, this search
will not fully end.

